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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR PATERNITY SUITS DOES NOT DENY ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-State v. West, No. 53,123, 23 FLA.

L.W. 265 (Sup. Ct. June 7, 1979).
In State v. West' the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitu-2
tionality of a four-year statute of limitations for paternity actions
against an equal protection challenge. In doing so the court applied
the traditional "rational basis" standard of review, stating that the
court's "job is to discern whether legitimate legislative purposes
exist, and then to ask whether the challenged classifications bear
some reasonable relation to the purposes."'3 Less than one year earlier, in In re Estate of Burris, the court had applied a stricter standard of review and actually analyzed the state's interest to determine
whether it justified "the statutory differentiation on the basis of
illegitimacy." 4
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the area
of illegitimacy, most of which are discussed in Justice Alderman's
dissenting opinion in West, 5 reveal considerable confusion regarding

the appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply. While it may be
difficult to determine exactly what standard the United States Supreme Court considers appropriate, it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court need not limit itself to the minimum guarantees of the
Federal Constitution.' The Florida Constitution contains an express
declaration of rights" which enhances and extends the individual
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Both West and Burris purport to be based on Trimble v. Gordon
in which the Court struck an Illinois statute that discriminated
against illegitimate children.' The Trimble Court stated that
"classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a 'realm of less than
strictest scrutiny,' . . . [but] the scrutiny 'is not a toothless one'
1. No. 53,123, 23 FLA. L.W. 265 (Sup. Ct. June 7, 1979).
2. FIA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b) (1977) states in relevant part: "Actions other than for recovery
(b)
of real property shall be commenced as follows: . . . (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS ....
An action relating to the determination of paternity."
3. 23 FLA. L.W. at 266.
4. 361 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1978).
5. 23 FLA. L.W. at 267-68. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 n.l (1977). The
Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of a statute of limitations
on paternity actions. The New York statute involved in Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978)
included a two-year statute of limitations, but that issue was not raised before the Supreme
Court. Id. at 524 n.5.
6. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 781 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 609, 612 (1978).
8. FLA. CONST. art. I.
9. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have been less than
clear but have, at least in part, applied the Trimble "middle tier"

standard of scrutiny." The effect of this standard is to compel a
state to closely articulate the specific concerns allegedly met by a
statute, to go beyond "the mere incantation of a proper state purpose."12

While the court in Burris required the state to go that extra step,
the West court, which did not cite Burris, 3 was content with finding
that "the state has a legitimate interest in having paternity claims
settled as early as possible after the event in question .... '"I The

court focused on language in Trimble which supports a minimal
standard of review,' 5 while ignoring the very next line of the Trimble
opinion which observed that "the standard just stated is a minimum; the Court sometimes requires more.""
The facts in West are uncontested. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services brought suit against Ronald Jerome
West to determine the paternity of a minor child receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) through the Department.' 7 The lower court specifically found that West was the natural
father of the child but held that the suit was barred by the statute
of limitations. West had on occasion bought clothing, shoes and food
for the child, but had never made any cash payments for her sup10. Id. at 767 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
11. See Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742
(1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 99 S. Ct. 518 (1978). Caban and Parham turn on the natural father's
rights to establish his legal relation to his illegitimate child and thus do not directly bear upon
this matter. For a discussion of the father's rights with respect to his illegitimate children
see Note, The Unwed Father: Conflict of Rights in Adoption Proceedings, 7 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 559 (1979).
12. 430 U.S. at 769.
13. The only mention of Burris is a "see also" reference in the dissent. 23 FLA. L.W. at
268.
14. Id. at 266.
15. The West decision noted that the United States Supreme Court has "reiterated its
previous declarations that legitimacy distinctions will not be sustained unless the particular
statutory classification bears 'some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.'"
Id. (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766-67).
16. 430 U.S. at 767.
17. FLA. STAT. § 409.2561 (1977) provides:
(3) By accepting public assistance for, or on behalf of, a dependent child, the
recipient is deemed to have made an assignment to the department of any right,
title, and interest in any child support obligation owed to or for said child up to
the amount of public assistance money paid for, or on behalf of, the dependent
child. The recipient is also deemed to have appointed the department as his [sic. I
attorney in fact to act in his [sic.] name, place, and stead to perform specific acts
relating to child support, including but not limited to:
(d) Executing verified complaints for the purpose of instituting an action for the
determination of paternity of a child born, or to be born, out of wedlock.
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port. The court held that the term "voluntary payments" in the
statute'8 means monetary payments, and thus the running of the
statute of limitations had not been tolled.'"
The supreme court affirmed stating that the "statute is designed
to foster the state's reasonable concern for discouraging fraudulent
claims and for promoting the fair administration of justice by ensuring that law suits will be instituted while proof is still available and
memories are still fresh." 20 The opinion contains no analysis of how
these goals are fostered by this statute. Nor is there any comparison
between the state's interests and the "rights of illegitimate children
to protection of the laws equal to that afforded to other natural but
legitimate children.'"2
Traditionally statutes of repose are based on a public policy of
preventing stale claims-the theory being that if a claim is valid the
right to have it enforced will be exercised promptly."2 While this
theory may be justified as applied to limitations of actions in general, it does not address the reality of the singular situation involved
in paternity suits. There are many reasons why a paternity action
might not be brought promptly. The father of the child might still
be present and might even be assisting on occasion (as did Mr. West
in the instant case). The mother's short-term interests might conflict with the child's long-term rights. There could also be an element of threat or duress involved, or simply lack of knowledge about
the proper procedures for establishing paternity of an illegitimate
child.
When any but the most "toothless" scrutiny is applied, the
"rational basis" of the Florida statute simply disappears. The alleged goal of the statute is to discourage fraudulent paternity
claims. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized "the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity," but
it has declared that problems of proof cannot "be made into an
impenetrable barrier."2 3 Rather, a statutory classification must be
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations." 4 The Florida statute fails to comport with this directive, as the means selected to
achieve the statutory goal is an arbitrary determination that paternity can only be proved within four years of a child's birth. This
18. FLA. STAT. § 95.051(1)(e) (1977) states: "The running of the time under any statute
of limitations . . . is tolled by . . . [vIoluntary payments by the alleged father of the child
in paternity actions during the time of the payments."
19. 23 FLA. L.W. at 265.
20. Id. at 266.
21. Burris, 361 So. 2d at 154-55.
22. 21 FA. JUR. Limitation of Actions § 3 (1958).
23. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
24. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
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creates an impenetrable barrier of time without considering any
alternatives.
A recent decision of the District of Columbia Superior Court recognized that a statute of limitations on paternity actions is not
rationally related to the legitimate state concern with fraudulent
claims. 25 That court noted that "[tihe mere passage of a certain
amount of time. . . has no logical connection with whether the noncustodial putative parent is or is not the actual parent."2 The focus
should rather be on "reliable methods of proof [which are] far more
directly related to establishing proof of parentage than . . . arbitrary time limitations ..
.",7 This is precisely the approach of the
United States Supreme Court in Lalli v. Lalli, which focused on the
actual availability of evidence of paternity."
In West the lower court found, after hearing the available evidence, that Mr. West was in fact the father of the child.2 9 Yet that
evidence was rendered totally irrelevant because the paternity action was not commenced within four years. Accordingly, the child
is forever barred from seeking a judicial determination of paternity.
As noted by the Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., it
is "illogical and unjust" to visit such condemnation on the innocent
child as "legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. ' 30 The Florida Supreme Court has
itself recognized that a mother cannot contract away a child's right
to support' 3 yet this statute allows her to totally foreclose her child's
rights through inaction. The court should not be .willing to condone
such an unnecessary deprivation of individual rights when feasible
alternatives are readily available.
If the state's purpose is to reduce spurious paternity claims, that
goal can most effectively be reached by focusing on the available
evidence, not by imposing an arbitrary time limit. Indeed, if scientific evidence can establish that a man is or is not the biological
father of a child, he will be no more or less so in one day or in twenty
years. In the past blood test results were admissible only as defendant's evidence of nonpaternity, since the probability of paternity
indicated by the available blood tests was not considered sufficient
to allow their use as plaintiffs proof. 3 However, the development
".

J.L.P. v. C.L.B., 107 DAILY WASHINGTON L. REP. 401 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1979).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
99 S. Ct. 518, 524 (1979).
23 FLA. L.W. at 265.
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 266-67 (1976).
32. Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO
Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543, 543 (1977-78).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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of a new system, Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) testing, should
drastically change the scope of paternity actions as this system
provides
an extremely high probability of paternity-usually over
90%. 3
Before a new scientific technique can be utilized as evidence, it
must be generally recognized in the-scientific community as accurate and reliable. The joint AMA-ABA guidelines for serologic testing in paternity cases recommend HLA as "the single most potent
method for exclusion." 34 A recent California case has gone so far as
to hold that it was reversible error for the lower court to exclude
HLA evidence as proof of paternity. 5
The holding in West that only monetary payments toll the running of the limitation period is equally disturbing for its refusal to
recognize the great variety of ways in which paternity can be acknowledged. Since the court felt compelled to uphold the validity
of the statute of limitations, it is unfortunate that it found it necessary to so technically construe the tolling provision. The court has
previously stated that it does not have to deliberate in a vacuum but
can consider society as it is." The West court observed that there is
no need for a mother to bring suit to establish paternity if she is
receiving monetary payments for the child's support.37 What the
court failed to recognize is that there is also no need to institute such
proceedings if she is receiving other forms of support for the child.
As noted in the dissenting opinion, although there was no verifiable
exchange of cash in this case, "West was delivering the equivalent
of money" to discharge his support obligation.38
The court in West noted that it is within the power of the legislature to establish classifications to meet legitimate goals. Perhaps it
would be more desirable to address this issue to the legislature. This
overlooks, however, that one of the arguments for applying strict
scrutiny to a legislative classification is that it affects a politically
impotent minority. There is no powerful lobby for illegitimate children, nor verbal proponents of their rights. The legislature might,
of course, recognize that the statute of limitations conflicts with the
33. Id. But see Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and
Other Statistical Evidence: A Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1979).
HLA testing is available at the Blood Bank and Histocompatability Laboratory of the
Shands Teaching Hospital at the University of Florida.
34. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 274 (1976). See also Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super.
513 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
35. County of Fresno v. Superior Ct., 92 Cal. App. 3d 133 (5th Ct. App. 1979). See also
Cramer v. Morrison, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (4th Ct. App. 1979).
36. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 265 (1976).
37. 23 FLA. L.W. at 265.
38. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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express legislative intent of Florida's child support enforcement
statute. 9 While it may be unfortunate for change to be motivated
by concerns of fiscal integrity rather than individual rights, the
result would be the same. If the legislature is aware of the potential
threat to the state's finances, and if the courts are willing to accept
scientific evidence such as HLA, the statute could be repealed. At
the very least the legislature should revise the tolling provisions to
take into account factors other than monetary payments.
The legitimate interest of the state in avoiding spurious paternity
claims can be served by carefully drafted statutes which focus on
the actual availability of evidence. An arbitrary time limit does not
significantly further the desired goal, especially in light of the fact
that it unnecessarily cuts off the rights of illegitimate children. If
the court is unwilling to find that such a classification "invidiously
and unreasonably discriminates against illegitimate children,"40 it
is to be hoped that the legislature will.
MARJORIE

E. SMITH

FLA. STAT. § 409.2551 (1977) provides in part:
It is declared to be the public policy of this state that this act be construed and
administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources of
responsible parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden presently borne
by the general citizenry through public assistance programs.
40. 23 FiA. L.W. at 266.
39.

